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Allocation of resources
The balance-of-payment difficulties of the 1960's called into play a wide
range of instruments designed primarily to control the external balance. Yet
these instruments inevitably created incentives which could, if allowed full
play, profoundly alter the allocation of resources in the Ghanaian economy.
The general direction of the incentives was largely one which favored the
already existing import-substitution and industrialization strategy. Hence, the
allocational effects of the exchange control and licencing system did not
counter, but usually reinforced, protectionist policies. The overall effect of
the combined policies was a substantial transformation of the composition of
economic activity within a brief period of 15 years.
The purpose of this chapter is to consider the general reallocation of
resources in the Ghanaian economy and to examine in more detail the alloca-
tive forces bearing on the favored industrial sector. We begin with an overview
of the changing composition of economic activity (section 1) and then turn
to an examination of the structure of industrial activities (section 2). The
remainder of the chapter is devoted to detailed consideration of industrial
protection (sections 3 and 4).
1. The changing structure of production, 1955—1969
• Kwame Nkrumah had led Ghana to political independence in 1957, but a
major objective which remained unfulfilled at that time was "economic inde-
pendence, without which our political independence would be valueless."
Hence, a "constant, fundamental guide is the need for economic independ-
ence.... An important essential is to reduce our colonial-produced economic
vulnerability...."2 This was to be done in large part by promoting import-
substituting industrialization for, he argued, "Every time we import goods
that we could manufacture...we are continuing our economic dependence and
delaying our industrial growth."3
A series of development plans, formulated in the 1950's, had been designed
1. Kwame Nkrumah,Africa Must Unite, first pubLished 1963; new edition, Internation-
al Publishers, New York, 1970, p. 107.
2.Ibid., p. 108.
3.Ibid., p. 112.
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to provide infrastructure and social services to lay the foundation and to
begin the process of industrialization.4 By the time of the Seven Year Devel-
opment Plan (1963), the commitment to an import-substitution strategy of
industrialization was strong.
To the largest degree possible domestic substitutes should be produced for those manu-
factured staples of consumer demand for whose supply Ghana is now entirely depen-
dent upon foreign sources and expends large sums in foreign exchange each year.5
To a remarkable extent the actual results, in terms of the composition of
economic activity, corresponded to the plans. Within a relatively short period
there was a major shift in the composition of economic activity. The available
national income estimates suggest that the turning point was in the early
1960's. The groundwork for this was laid in the last half of the 1950's, with
the economy growing at a satisfactory real rate, and gradual shifts in the
industrial origin of GDP.
To illustrate the changing composition of economic activity, let us con-
sider the contrast between 1955 and 1960, as contained in Table Ill-I.
Despite some difficulties with the data (discussed below) one can discern a
number of major characteristics of the 195 5-60 period. There was a relative
shift from cocoa and local foods, whose shares declined by about 3 percent-
age points each, and a shift to the activities of forestry and sawmilling, manu-
facturing, other industries (mostly organized commercial transport, distribu-
tion and services), government enterprises and general government. In other
words, the shift was from traditional agriculture towards "modern" activities.
Nevertheless, many of these modern activities were still relatively small in
1960. Manufactures and government enterprises (including electricity), which
were to grow substantially in the 1960's, together still accounted for less than
4 percent of GDP.
Turning to the 1960's, we are not as fortunate in the availability of nation-
al accounts estimates by industrial origin.6 Table 111-2 is a very rough attempt
to put together some of the available statistics to give an indication of the
approximate proportions of GNP originating in a few of the important sec-
tors. In these rough terms, what emerges is a continuing decline in the share
of cocoa producer incomes to the point that by 1969 value-added at producer
prices in manufacturing exceeded that in cocoa. Also declining relatively in
the 1960's were the other two traditional export sectors, logging and saw-
milling, and mining —thelatter very rapidly. Construction's share also de-
clined.
4.The plans of the 1950's were: First Development Plan (1951 —1957), Consolidation
Development Plan (1957—1959), and Second Development Plan (1959—1964).
5. Republic of Ghana, Seven Year Development Plan, Accra, 1963, P. 93.
9 6. Work on gathering GDP by industrial origin for the period 1965—1968 is in progress
within the Central Bureau of Statistics. At the time of writing these were not yet
publicly available.
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Table Ill-I
Industrial origin of GDP, 1955 and 1960 at current market prices
(in millions of new cedis)
Note:The GDP estimate is derived from the expenditure side. These estimates of
industrial origin, which do not cover the entire range of activities, are equated
with GDP by inclusion of the residual item.
Source:Dorothy Walters, Report on the NationalAccounts of Ghana, 1955—1961,
mimeograph, CBS, Accra, 1962, Tables I and II, pp. 2-3.
We should emphasize that the data of Tables 111.1 and 111-2 are subject to
some severe limitations. First, there is the usual problem of double counting
—value-addedfor a particular activity included in more than one sector —
whichlimits our confidence in any absolute size comparison between sectors.
Second, the components of Tables 111-1 and 111-2 are based on 1960 bench-
mark ratios of value-added to gross output. To the extent that substantial
structural change occurred between, say, 1955 and 1969, comparisons of
relative sectoral growth are open to doubt. Further, the total GDP estimates
—whichare made from the expenditure side —arealso based on 1960
benchmarks. The most serious shortcoming of this approach is undoubtedly









Cocoa -production 84 12.6 90 9.6 1.4
- marketing 46 6.9 60 6.4 5.5
Other exports 2 0.3 6 0.6 24.6
Local food prodn. and distribution220 32.9 278 29.6 4.8
Forestry and sawmilling 28 4.2 52 5.5 13.2
Mining 30 4.5 42 4.5 7.0
Manufacturing 4 0.6 18 1.9 35.1
Construction, private 24 3.6 36 3.8 8.4
Industries, other private 60 9.0 114 12.2 13.7
Rent (net), pers. and hsld. serv. 56 8.4 86 9.2 9.0
Govt. enterprise and public corp. 6 0.9 18 1.9 24.6
General government 26 3.9 48 5.1 13.0
Residual 82 12.3 90 9.6 1.9
(1) GDP at mkt. prices(expenditure) 668 100 938 100 7.0
(2) Indirect taxes 90 92
(3) GDP at factor cost 578 846
(4) Net factor income from abroad —4 —10
(5) Expenditure on GNP at
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Sourcesto Table 111-2 -
Sources:1. GNP at market prices, computed from expenditure side only. Sources:
1955, D. Walters, op. cit.; others, Economic Survey, 1969.
2.Value-added in electricity generation and distribution. Sources: 1960, R.
Szereszewski, "The Inter-sectoral Accounts," Table 3.1., in Birmingham et
aL; 1965 and 1969,Economic Survey, 1969.
3.Timber and sawmilling exports includes exports of logs, lumber and
plywood, less export duties on logs and lumber. Sources: 1955 and 1960,
CBS, Annual Report on External Trade of Ghana, 1958, and 1959—1960;
1965 and 1969, CBS, Quarterly Digest of Statistics. June 1968 and Decem-
ber 1969.
4.Manufacturing value-added excluding sawmilling and plywood. Sources:
1955, Walters; 1960, Szereszewski; 1965 and 1969, Economic Survey,
1969.
5.Mining value-added. Sources: 1955 and 1960, Walterslessmineral export
duties from Annual Report on External Trade of Ghana, 1958, and 1959—
1960; 1965 and 1969, Economic Survey, 1969. The mines' own production
of electricityis included in the value-added computation for 1955 and
1960, excluded in 1965 and 1969. This accounted for 36.3 percent of total
national killowatt hours in 1965 and 0.8 percent in 1969.
6. Cocoa value-added consists of purchases by the Marketing Board at the
cash price received by producers less purchases of insecticides. Sources:
1960, Szereszewski; for 1955 and 1965, producer receipts recorded in
CMB Annual Report, 1962/63 and 1964/65 provided figures on weekly
purchases, which were converted to calendar-year figures, and producer
prices. 1969 data obtained directly from CMB. The Szereszewski ratio of
value-added to gross output of 99.35 percent is applied to yield the results
in our table.
7.Construction value-added. 1960 from Szereszewski; gross output for 1955
from Walters, "Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation in Buildings and
Other Construction and Works"; and 1965 and 1969 from Economic Sur-
vey, 1969, "Gross Domestic Fixed Capital Formation in Building and Con-
struction" The Szereszewski ratio of value-added to gross output of 64.64
percent applied to 1955, 1965 and 1969 data to yield the results in our
table.
8.Public consumption value-added. 1960 from Szereszewski; 1955, from Wal-
ters, "General Government Consumption Expenditure"; 1965 and 1969,
"General Government Consumption Expenditure," in Economic Survey,
1969. The Szereszewski ratio of value-added to total expenditure of 5 1.84
percent is applied to 1955, 1965 and 1969 data to yield the results in our
table.
9.Total probably overstates extent of coverage due to possibilities of double
counting between activities listed.
jGrowth of the Industrial Sector
is assumed to grow at the same real rate as estimated population growth, and
is converted to current values by the local foods price index. Third, the data
of Tables 111-1 and 111-2 are in current prices because constant price data for
the details are unavailable. Thus, the changing sectoral shares of national
income we observe involve both changes in volume and changes in prices. The
data do tell us how the distribution of income between sectors has changed,
but they do not tell us the extent to which quantities of factors have shifted
between sectors. This is particularly important in the largely import-substitut-
ing manufacturing sector, whose growth in the 1960's was due to substantial
protection.
Despite these of the data, a strong impression remains that the
distribution of economic activity was substantially altered in the 1960's. The
favored modern sectors, particularly manufacturing, now received important
shares of national income. In this redistributive sense the objective of indus-
trialization was being successfully attained. Yet when we recognize that a
substantial price element was contained in the growth of manufacturing (see
section 2, following) and, as we shall see in Chapter IV, that the economy as a
whole failed to provide significant overall growth of per capita incomes in the
1960's, the strategy of industrialization to induce real growth was clearly far
less than a success.
2. Growth of the industrial sector
We turn now to a more detailed examination of the industrial sector,
considering first a variety of aggregate indicators for the whole sector (min-
ing, manufacturing, electricity), as contained in Table 111-3. Unfortunately,
our period of coverage is limited. Industrial surveys were conducted for 1958
and 1959, but not resumed until 1962. Further, the detailed reports beyond
1968 are not yet published. As a result, much of the important detail, such as
constant price data and value-added per person engaged. is available for less
than the full period of this study. Despite these limitations, a number of
important aspects of Ghanaian industrial development are clear.
The price element in the growth of industrial output and value-added was
substantial. In current prices, value-added grew by about 143 percent be-
tween 1962 and 1969, while at constant prices the growth was 50 percent.
One will further note that the constant price series probably overstates real
values because of the major structural change over this brief period. New
entrants typically required greater protection than was enjoyed by the early
entrants. Flowever, the higher prices for the former have a low or negligible
weight in the price index used to deflate the current price data.
Growth of employment in industry was markedly slower than growth of54 Allocation of Resources
Table 111-3
Selected industrial statistics, 1958, 1962, and 1966—1969
1958 1962 1966 196719681969
1. Gross output (in millions of Nt1)
is. current prices 86.6122.3 208.3 241.1 295.8 337.0
lb.constant (1962)prices NA.122.3 173.0 179.9 204.0 217.6
2.Value-added (in millions of
2a. current prices 57.081.2 142.1 158.4 176.7 197.7
2b. constant (1962) prices N.A.81.2 120.1 119.7 124.4 121.7
3. Persons engaged (thousands) NA.60.969.969.577.6 N.A.
4. V.-a. per person engaged
(in thousands of
4a. current prices NA. 1.332.032.282.28 N.A.
4b. constant (1962) prices 1.331.721.721.61 NA.
5. Wages and salaries (in millions of N.A.24.334.436.644.3 N.A.
6. Wages and salaries per person
engaged
6a. current prices NA. 399.2 492.1 526.8 570.3 N.A.
6b. constant (1962) consumer prices N.A.399.2 287.1 335.8 336.1 N.A.
7. Distribution of v.-a. by nationality
of ownership (percent)- Ghanaian NA.26.826.927.529.3 N.A.
-Non-Ghanaian N.A.67.059.258.551.5 N.A.
-Mixed N.A. 6.213.214.019.2 N.A.
8. Distribution of v.-a. by type
of ownership (percent)- State N.A.22.922.123.524.7 N.A.
-Joint-State-Priv. N.A. 4.28.19.011.7 N.A.
-Co-op N.A. 0.10.1 0.10.0 N.A.
-Private N.A.72.969.767.463.6 N.A.
9. Distribution of v.-a. by region
manufg. only (percent)- Western N.A.42.333.230.825.9 N.A.
-AccraCap. Dist. N.A.31.045.851.553.3 N.A.
-Ashanti NA.17.117.613.516.9N.A.
-Other N.A. 9.63.44.33.9 N.A.
Notes:1. 1958 entry under gross output refers to sales, not gross output.
2. The deflator used to obtain the constant price wage and salary series is the
consumer price index.
3. Regional distribution of value-added refers to manufacturing only.
Sources:1969, CBS, Economic Survey, 1969; 1966—1968, CBS, Industrial Statistics,
1966—1968; 1962, CBS Industrial Statistics, 1962—1964;1958, CBS, Indus-
trial Statistics, 1958—1959.
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output or value-added. The rate of growth of constant price value-added
between 1962 and 1968 was twice the rate of growth of employment. At the
same time, employees do not appear to have captured a larger share of value-
added. Looking at current price data, the share of wages and salaries in
value-added fell from 30 percent in 1962 to 25 percent in 1968. To put it
another way, value-added grew at a rate two-thirds greater than the rate of
growth of wages and salaries. And, the wages and salaries per employee, when
deflated by the consumer price index, declined by about 16 percent between
1962 and 1968. The industrial sector thus does not appear to have proven a
dynamic source of growth for either employment or income of employees
over the period.
The distribution of ownership of the industrial sector indicates the domi-
nance of private foreign owners followed by Ghanaian state-owned activity.
Since by definition state-owned enterprises are Ghanaian, we can see that the
privately-owned Ghanaian enterprises account for a small portion of value-
added. The foreign private owners have had a decreasing share, but this is
largely due to increasing use of the joint state-foreign private form of enter-
pyise, and is not the result of growth by private Ghanaian firms.
The distribution of manufacturing value-added by region series indicates a
shift of the center of manufacturing activity from the Western Region to the
Accra Capital District. (We cite only the manufacturing data, because the
location of mining activity is determined largely by deposits, while electricity
is, from 1966, almost entirely from the Volta Dam.) A variety of reasons is
undoubtedly responsible for the increasing dominance of the Accra district in
manufacturing activity. Since nearly all of the sector produces for the domes-
tic market, location in the largest single high money income market is un-
doubtedly important. Added to this are the advantages of the modern port of
Tema for imports of materials and equipment, and the network of transport
and communication facilities that radiate from Accra. Finally, Accra has the
major advantage of being located close to the grantors of import licences and
other discretionary favors.
Turning from the aggregate picture of the industrial sector, consider now
the growth of output and value.added in individual activities outlined in
Table 1114. The patterns of growth were far from uniform. In 1958 the
strong dominance of the traditional activities of mining arid sawmihing, plus
the "easy" import-substitution activities of beverages and tobacco, are clearly
evident. Only one "modern" activity, transport equipment, had a value-added
exceeding 1 million. In 1962 the picture is much the same, except for the
emergence of a significant edible oils and chemicals manufacturing activity, it
is at this point that the beginning of major change in the structural shares of
industrial production becomes evident. By 1965 two new industries, metal
products and petroleum refining, emerged as important contributors to indus-56 Allocation of Resources
Table 111-4
Industrialsector, value-added and gross output, 1958, 1959, and 1962—1968 at current
































Footwear, apparel and textile goods
Sawmilling and plywood
Furniture manufactures
Paper and paper production
Printing and publishing
Travel goods manufactures
Manufactures of raw rubber
Chemicals and oils manufactures
Petroleum refining
Non-metal mineral production
Iron and steel manufactures
Metal products






































Notes:1. Entries may not add to total due to rounding.
2. = novalue recorded.
3. Coverage includes only those establishments with 30 or more employees.
4. Major items contained in broadly-defined 2-digit groups are:
Group Major subgroups included
12 gold, bauxite, and manganese
19 salt, diamonds
20 meat, fruit squash, fruit and vegetable processing, flour, biscuits, bread, cocoa
butter, misc. foor preparations
21 spirits, beer, soft drinks
23 spinning, weaving and knitting
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3.26.710.7 9.1 — — 1.73.34.45.88.312.721.619.5
) 14.713.08.916.1 14.615.920.420.221.623.422.723.724.130.5
5 1.71.31.3 1.3 0.50.7 2.52.83,53.12.92.32.42.4
1.42.73.3 4.9 — — 0.20.8 1.01.42.85.06.29.1
) 4.04.45.2 4.2 2.3 1.82.44.13.13.45.45.66.77.0




















































































































31 -industrialchemicals, copra oil, groundnut oil, palm kernel oil, other oil fats,
paints, soap, matches, perfume, pharmaceuticals, detergents, candles
33 -bricksand tiles, glass and products, cement, concrete blocks
35 -aluminumware, nails, misc, other
38 -boatbuilding and repaix, railway equipment, motor vehicle assembly
39 -plastics
Sources: Computed from CBS,Industrial Statistics, 1958—1959, 1962—1964, 1965—1966, 1966--1968;
and from CBS, Economic Survey, 1969.58 Allocation of Resources
trial value-added. Between 1965 and 1969 a substantial alteration in the
industrial structure took place. In the latter year several nontraditional activi-
ties, including food manufacturing, footwear and apparel, paper products,
non-metal mineral products, and metal products, had also emerged as impor-
tant segments of the industrial sector. In addition, new activities such as
travel goods, iron and steel, electrical appliances and apparatus, and plastics
had become smaller, but undoubtedly permanent, parts of the Ghanaian in-
dustrial scene.
The growth of some activities was in part due to the "normal" course of
events in which they became relatively more profitable due to forces such as
larger markets, cheaper inputs (e.g., electricity), and the availability of low-
cost specialized factors. Growth of specific activities was also in part due to a
set of deliberate import-substitution policies involving a variety of incentives
to favored activities. It is to these incentives that we now turn.
3. Protection of industry
A great variety of incentive policies was employed to stimulate domestic
production in import-substituting industries. In this section we focus on the
protection of domestic production vis-à-vis the world market.7 We begin with
a review of the major devices used to protect local industry.
(a) The protective system
The Ghanaian system of protection revolved largely around the system of
tariffs and indirect taxes together with import licencing. Our earlier discus-
sion (Chapter II) of these instruments focused attention on their broad appli-
cation, passing over their detailed use to discriminate between domestic and
imported commodities at a very fine level of detail. Yet the issue facing a
local producer concerns the extent to which those specific imports that com-
pete directly with his lines are permitted and at what price, together with the
availability and price of his required inputs, including importable inputs. The
various instruments used in the protective system are generally capable of
discriminating in favor of an individual producer at the necessary level of
detail.8
7. In the process of providing protection against foreign products there will also be
discrimination among domestic producers. This aspect, together with other devices
used specifically to discriminate among domestic activities, is taken up in Chapter IV
below.
8. However, because some producers may use inputs produced by others, itis not
always possible in practice to provide the desired in favor of all
import-competing
producers.Protection of Industry 59
Consider each of the major elements in the protective system which pre-
vailed in the period 1968—1970. First, the Ghanaian customs tariff frequently
discriminated at the level of detail corresponding to the SITC 6-digit level,
and on occasion at an even finer level of detail. Typically the tariff escalated
by "stage" of production, with low rates on materials and higher rates on
finished products, particularly those produced locally.9 In addition to the
rate of differentiation by degree of product processing, there were conces-
sionary rates on materials of any type which were specifically destined for use
in the manufacture of numerous particular products.
0
Addedto the customs tariff was a set of domestic indirect taxes designed
largely to raise revenue. However, because there was rate differentiation be-
tween domestic and foreign sources on some commodities, the indirect tax
system affected the level of nominal protection. The major indirect taxes
were the sales tax, the excise tax, and the purchase tax. The sales tax was
administered at the manufacturer and customs house level, and was applied
equally to most imported and domestic goods for final use at the standard
rate of 1percent. Exemptions included producer goods, "essential" con-
sumer goods, corporations enjoying tax concessions,and sales for export.
The excise tax was levied on the traditional objects of alcoholic beverages and
tobacco, plus a set of specified "luxuries" at rates ranging from 5 percent to
1 5 percent and a few specific rates. Exemptions in practice were the same as
for the sales tax. The excise tax applied onl1 to domestic output, but the
sales tax was reduced on excisable items topercent or 5percent,depend-
ing on the item. Coverage did not yet include a number of recent import-
substitution luxuries such as electrical appliances. The purchase tax applied to
motor vehicles only, at rates on a rising step scale. Locally assembled com-
mercial vehicles enjoyed a lower rate.
The combined protective effect of the tariffs and domestic indirect tax
system was complex and often difficult to evaluate for an individual product
line. Further, a change in one element without a compensating change in
another often resulted in unintended changes in protection. Despite the com-
plexity and frequent changes in individual rates, there was no continuing and
9. For example, in the BTN Chapters 50 through 56 dealing with fibers and products
thereof, cotton, flax, and man-made fibers are subject to a 10 percent duty while
woven fabrics are subject to a minimum 75 percent rate (NLC Decree, 185, (1967).
10. These are specified in Part B of the import tariff schedule, Republic of Ghana,
Customs and Excise Tariff, Accra, 1966.
11.While apparently the Volta Aluminum Company (VALCO) is the only firm legally
entitled to exemption on its purchases, others employing tax concessions believe
to be exempt and do not pay.60 Allocation of Resources
systematic evaluation of the protective effects by a "tariff board" type of
agency.
In early 1969 an additional tax on imports was introduced in the form of a
"temporary surcharge" on OGL imports. Initially the rate was 5 percent of
c.i.f. value and applied only to what was at the time a limited list of OGL
items. The budget presented in mid-1970 contained a substantial extension of
the OGL list together with a differentiated set of surcharges at rates ranging
from 5percentto 150 percent of c.i.f. value on most OGL imports.'
2Inone
swift stroke the protective structure was greatly altered, yet there is no evi-
dence that the protective consequences of this new complex addition to the
protective system received detailed advance consideration.
A second major element in the protective system was import licencing. In
principle the licencing system was expected to limit or prevent imports com-
peting with domestic products; it was also expected to ensure that local
producers receive adequate supplies of imported materials.1 'Inpractice the
restricted lists for which "no application will be entertained except under
special circumstances,"4 allowed a substantial volume of imports.'And as
we have noted (Chapter II), in the late Nkrumah period shortages of inputs
were frequent. As a source of protection for domestic producers the licencing
system was uncertain and erratic.
In addition to the specifically protective devices listed, the Capital Invest-
ments Board had at its disposal a variety of concessions which it could grant
to foreign investors with substantial protective consequences. Of particular
interest in the context of protection, a producer of goods for export or
import-substitution could be exempted from the payment of duties and indi-
rect taxes on imported inputs, and apparently from the payment of excise
taxes on output, for a period of 5years.'
6Beyondthe number of projects
approved, which has averaged about 15 per year since 1965, with a typical
investment of about 2 million,nodetails on the concessions granted
12. See Chapter V/section 4, for general discussion of the surchages in the context of
the liberalization.
13. See Chapter II, section 5.
14. This, the typical phrase used to indicate the meaning of the restricted list, appeared
in the Commercial and Industrial Bulletin, 18 August, 1967.
15. For example, the restricted items listed in ibid. for 1968 were imported during 1968
to a total of at 16 million, or 5.1 percent of total imports (our tabulation).
This does not include restricted items defined more narrowly than the SITC 6-digit
trade data contained in the CBS, External Trade Statistics, December, 1968.
16. In addition, the Capital Investments Act, 1963 (Act 172) authorized the Board to
guarantee repatriation of funds, grant exemption from company income tax for up
to 10 years, grant accelerated depreciation allowances, and grant exemptions from
property taxes.
17. Capital Investments Board,Annual Report and Accounts, various years.Protection of Industry 61
are publicly available. We understand, however, that there was considerable
variation in the concessions granted investors until 1971, largely because an
ever-changing Board made decisions on an individual basis.' 8Itis thus quite
possible for three different domestic producers of the same commodity to
face substantially different situations: a domestically-owned enterprise with
no concessions, a foreign-owned enterprise with one or two concessions, and
a second foreign-owned enterprise with the full basket of concessions.
Altogether, then, several instruments were used to grant protection, with
levels of individual instruments for particular establishments and industries
determined independently by different agencies.'9It is important to note
that one agency did not play a significant part in the detailed assignment of
protection to individual activities. This was the planning agency. While, as we
noted above, the development plan charted the general course of import-
substituting industrialization, planning was largely divorced from the adminis-
tration of the protective system. Thus, the magnitudes of the incentives were
not determined by the detailed priorities of the plan, but rather by a hap-
hazard system of protection which conferred vastly different stimuli on indi-
vidual activities in the industrial sector. To measure these stimuli is our next
task. We begin with a brief outline of the method of measurement.
(b) Method of measuring protection
The magnitude of the protective stimuli afforded each domestic industrial
activity depends on the structure of price divergencies between domestic and
international markets created by the various protective instruments. The sub-
sidy effect arising from protection of output and the taxing effect of higher
18. Recently an augmented staff has attempted to apply uniform criteria and conces-
sions.
19. To illustrate, consider a hypothetical potential foreign investor who in 1968 had
been promised a set of CIB concessions involving duty.free entry of machinery and
spare parts (but not materials) plus a company tax holiday. He would be the sole
producer of the item in the domestic market. He had a great variety of ways open to
him to increase the potential protection. He might have tried to convince the Minis-
ter (or Commissioner) of Finance to increase the tariff on competing imports, or to
establish a special concessionary rate for imports of his inputs. He could have tried to
persuade Customs and Excise to reduce the excise tax on domestic production to a
lower bracket. He could have attempted to convince the Trade Division of the
Ministry of Trade and Industries to limit the licences issued for competing imports,
and simultaneously dealt with the Industries Division of the same Ministry to ensure
adequate licences for his imported materials. And, he could have attempted to obtain
further concessions from the CIB. The degree of protection received thus depended
on the policies of several agencies, each capable of acting independently of the
't others.62 Allocation of Resources
input costs are well known.2 0 Our purpose here is to apply the general
principles, using standard definitions, to the Ghanaian case. We have taken
into account the major devices that create a measurable divergence between
international and domestic prices.
To illustrate the relationships involved, consider the effect of each instru-
ment. First, import tariffs raise domestic prices above world prices. Second,
indirect taxes are sometimes applied to imports and/or domestic production,
possibly at different rates.2Third, and often most important, licences give
rise to quota premia that raise domestic prices above the tariff and tax-laden
prices. Finally, various devices such as licence fees and the system of compul-
sory credit purchasing of imports add to the price of importables. The first
three elements are illustrated in Figure Ill-i. The domestic supply curve at
free-trade prices is S, and the domestic demand curve is D, yielding free-trade
imports of QOQ6 at the free-trade price of The effect of a tariff on
competing imports of the product at the rate t is to raise the domestic price
to + t), assuming infinitely elastic supply of imports. Tariffs on interme-
date importable inputs result in a parallel upward shift in the supply curve to
S'. The net result of the tariffs alone would be an expansion of output to
inresponse to the net stimulus provided by the tariff-protecting output less
the higher input costs.
If we add indirect taxes to the set of tariffs, we find that indirect taxes
imports raise the domestic price to is the indirect
tax rate on imports. At the same time indirect taxes on domestic output shift
the supply curve proportionately upward toS'(l+sd),where sd is the indirect
tax rate on domestic output. (We have drawn Figure Ill-i such that sm
exceeds sd) The net result of the set of tariffs plus the set of indirect taxes is
a stimulus to output, yielding an expansion to Q2.
Finally,if the domestic market is competitive and we impose on this
situation a binding quota on imports of the competing product, setting the
quota at quantity,which is less than Q2Q5,thedomestic price rises to
In other words, the domestic price rises above the world price by the rate
qr, and domestic output expands to Q3-
20.The literature on this topic is far too large for a single footnote. Two major seminal
pieces are: W.M. Corden, "The Structure of a Tariff System and the Effective Protec-
tive Rate," Journal of Political Economy, Vol. LXXIV, No. 3, June 1966, PP. 221-
37; and H.G. Johnson, "The Theory of Tariff Structure with Special Reference to
World Trade and Development," Trade and Development, Institut Universitaire de
Hautes Etudes Internationales, Geneva, 1965.
21. See J. Clark Leith, "Tariffs, Indirect Taxes and Protection," in H.G. Grubel and H.G.
Johnson, eds., Effective Tariff Protection, GATT and Graduate Institute of Interna-
tional Studies, Geneva, 1971.
IThe net effect of the various protective devices illustrated in Figure Ill-i is
a stimulus to output amounting to bc per unit. This has resulted in an expan-
sion of output along the original supply curve from point a to point c, for a
change in output quantity of QOQ3-Ifour interest is in matters involving the
product market such as the extent of import-substitution or restriction of
imports, the net stimulus of bc is expressed as a rate with respect to the free
trade price the net rate of protection of output. If however we are
interested in the process by which value is added by primary factors, the net
stimulus is more appropriately considered with respect to free-trade per unit
value-added: the effective rate of protection of value-added.22
In cases where the quota is the binding constraint on imports, such as the
competitive case illustrated in Figure 111-1, it may be important to know how
much of the protection is attributable to the quota and how much due to the
22. For further discussion of the net and effective rates of protection, as well as the
assumptions underlying the analysis, see J. Clark Leith, "The Effect of Tariffs on
Production, Consumption and Trade: A Revised Analysis," American Economic Re-
view, Vol. LXI, No. 1, March 1971.














Fig. 111-1. Protection of domestic market.64 Allocation of Resources
other devices such as tariffs and indirect taxes. For example, if the quota
restriction on competing imports were to be lifted by placing an item on
OGL, we would want to know what would happen to protection of domestic
activities. When there is a monopoly in domestic production (but the quota is
not held monopolistically), use of a quota instead of a tariff enables the
domestic monopolist to exercise his monopoly power. Hence if the quota is
set at the same level of imports as would prevail under a tariff, the quota
premium exceeds the tariff and domestic production is less than under a
tariff.2In either case —monopolyor competition in the domestic market
it is useful to calculate both the premium due to the binding quota restriction
and the latent premium due to tariffs and indirect taxes which would pertain
in the absence of the quota. The difference then tells us how much premium
the licence system provides over and above the tariff and indirect tax system.
Changes in the magnitudes of the various components of the protective
structure can also be considered. For example, the introduction of extensive
surcharges in 1970, which simultaneously placed many items on OGL, can be
considered by recalculating the protection under the new situation.
For empirical application, the relationships among the various protective
devices are expressed precisely in algebraic form. The derivations and the
formulas are contained in Appendix C. To apply the formulas we required
an extensive body of data for each of the wide range of industrial activities
covered: inputs and outputs, together with data on the magnitudes of the
protective devices employed.
Our primary data source was the Central Bureau of Statistics' (CBS) an-
nual survey of industrial establishments employing over 30 persons. With the
cooperation of the CBS Industrial Statistics Section we were able to obtain
detailed extracts from the returns of inputs, outputs, and indirect taxes, all at
the establishment level. Confidentiality of individual returns was maintained
by use of an identification code showing only industry, region, and establish-
ment number.
The establishment data all refer to 1968, which was the latest year for
which reasonably complete returns were available when we began this work.
The results thus provide a picture of the situation in a period of relative
economic stability. Liberalization, following the devaluation in mid-1967, I.
wasbeginning, but the OGL list was largely confined to industrial materials,
23. For a discussion of the differences between a tariff and a quota when competitive
conditions do not hold, see Jagdish Bhagwati, "On the Equivalence of Tariffs and
Quotas," in R.E. Baldwin, eta!., eds., Trade, Growth and the Balance of Payments —
Essaysin Honor of Gottfried Haberler, Rand-McNally, Chicago, 1965. Bhagwati also
analyses cases where there is monopoly holding of quotas, which is not of major
interest in the Ghanaian case.
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spare parts, and a few essential consumer items. The licencing system was
running about as smoothly as in any year, and few tariff changes were insti-
tuted during the year.
Additional information not provided in the industrial statistics data had to
be obtained from other sources. Our first step in this regard was to match
each of the outputs and inputs listed by an establishment with the appropri-
ate SITC 6-digit import item. For the quota premium rate on output we
calculated the rate of excess of unit value of domestic output over the 1968
c.i.f. unit value of the competing 6-digit import item. We then calculated a
weighted average quota premium (using domestic production at c.i.f. unit
values as weights) for the establishment. For the tariff rate on output we
calculated the ratio of 1968 duty collections for the matching SITC 6-digit
item to the 1968 c.i.f. import values, and similarly for the sales tax rate on
imports. The weighted average for the establishment also used weights at
tax-free prices. We chose to use the collections rate rather than the scheduled
rate because there are large discrepancies between the two due to numerous
exemptions of duties granted various importers.2The difference between
the scheduled and the collections rates is not trivial. Scheduled tariff collec-
tions on all imports would have yielded a tariff rate of 47.6 percent for 1968,
whereas the actual collections rate for the same year was 20.1 percent.25 On
the grounds that it is virtually impossible to segment the duty-free and duty-
paid markets in Ghana, we assumed that the tariff component of the domes-
tic manufacturers' protection is only the average rate of duties and indirect
• taxes on competing imports, not the maximum.
Our approach to estimating the quota premium rate is subject to the usual
• shortcoming of unit value comparisons. In addition, it does not allow for real
or imagined qualitative differences between the domestic and foreign goods,
and hence does not tell us the extent to which the restrictive system allows
the price of the domestic good to rise above what the price of that same good
would be under free trade. Rather, it simply tells us how much the price of
• the domestic good exceeds the price of the foreign good. Ideally it is the
former comparison that is of interest in considering the protection of domes-
tic production: a with-versus-without comparison. At a minimum, the in-
crease in the price of the domestic product due to the quota restriction is
covered by the increase in the price of the foreign product due to tariffs and
24. As far as we could determine, the imports and duty collections (including sales tax
on imports) are recorded at the same time. Hence a timing problem does not arise.
25. The scheduled rate was computed by determining the scheduled import duties (but
• not sales tax) for each SITC 6-digit item in the CBS, External Trade Statistics,
December 1968, on the assumption that all imports of the item attracted full duty.
The actual collections rate is from Table 11-1 above.66 A (location of Resources
indirect taxes. Hence whenever the nominal protection due to tariffs and
indirect taxes exceeds the calculated quota premium (and the tariff is not
redundant), or when we are unable to calculate a quota premium, we use the
tariffs and indirect taxes on imports as our nominal rate of protection.
Turning to the input side, there are three types of inputs distinguished in
our establishment data: materials, fuels and lubricants, and electricity. For
materials, due to a general absence of quantity information, we were forced
to settle for the inflation of costs due to tariffs and taxes, which is a mini-
mum inflation that does not take into account the possibility of quota premia
on these inputs. However, because most inputs were on OGL in 1968, this is
not a serious shortcoming.2
6Theinflation of material input costs that we did
take into account are of two types:
(1) duties and indirect taxes paid on directly imported inputs; and
(2) in the limited number of instances where it occurred, higher cost importa-
ble inputs purchased locally.
For the first, we computed the rate by taking the ratio of duties paid to
purchases of imported materials. For the second, we relied on the duty and
sales tax collections on the matching SITC 6-digit imports as a proportion of
the c.i.f. value of these imports, hence treating the importable inputs pur-
chased locally as if they had been imported and duties paid on them. An
average for each establishment was calculated, usingweights at free-trade
prices.
Petroleum fuels and lubricants constitute a relatively small proportion of
most establishments' inputs, so we did not attempt a detailed disaggregatiori,
but simply used the proportion of duties plus indirect taxes to total supply of
fuels and lubricants to deflate use of petroleum fuels and lubricants.
Electricity comes largely from the Volta Dam, and is not directly subject
to any trade distortion; consequently, we did not adjust use of electricity in
our calculations.2
From what we have indicated so far, it is clear that our data and methods
will subject our results to a number of qualifications. Specifically, we should
note the following. First, our matching of domestic production and use of
importable materials that are not directly imported with imports at the SITC
6-digit level was done to avoid the well known downward bias resulting from
weighting tariff and quantitative premia rates by imports when items subject
26. To the extent that there were still quota premia on inputs, this procedure implicitly
includes the input premia as part of the protection of value-added and output re-
ceived by the producers. And in most cases producers do in fact receive the premia
because licences for industrial materials go to actual users rather than intermediaries.
27. Additional data problems and methods are discussed in Appendix C.Protection of Industry 67
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todifferent rates are grouped. However, the result of this is the possibility of
some arbitrarily narrow definitions of competing imports.
Second, our coverage is confined to an arbitrary selection of "large" estab-
lishments —theseknown to CBS and completing the 1968 annual detailed
return less those whose returns we omitted because of inconsistent or incom-
plete data. Consequently, our results must be treated with some caution in
drawing conclusions about the overall degree of protection of Ghanaian in-
dustrial activities. Rather, they are simply indicators of the wide range of
protection enjoyed by Ghanaian industrial activities.
Third, we have no way of confirming the accuracy of our input—output
data. There is the very basic problem of accurate accounting records. While
we have eliminated some establishments because of incomplete or inconsis-
tent returns, there probably remain others who had the foresight to enter any
set of consistent numbers just to complete the form and avoid a call-back
from a CBS official. This problem could have been minimized by undertaking
the primary data collection ourselves, but only at the cost of a much more
limited coverage. Beyond this, there is the problem of deliberately faked
returns. Although the CBS assures the reporting firms that the return is
confidential and will not be used for taxation or similar purposes, we are
skeptical of the extent to which firms do report accurately. If a firm is
keeping a double set of books, itis highly unlikely that it would use its
private set to complete the questionnaire for the CBS, or anyone else. This
possibility introduces a number of potential biases into our data. It means
that we can generally expect the returns not to omit payment of duties on
inputs and sales and excise taxes on output if they are liable for them. Hence,
on the whole there is unlikely to be much understatement of these items.
There is, however, the general incentive to overstate costs of inputs and
understate the value of the output. This tends to reduce reported value-
added, and where the effective rate exceeds the nominal rate this inflates the
computed effective rate of protection.28 At the same time, value-added at
world prices is understated more than the effective rate of
protection is overstated and as a consequence the computed net rate of
protection is slightly understated.
The second major bias in our calculations arises from our inability to take
into account possible quantitative premia on material inputs. This tends to
reduce the computed value-added at world prices and hence inflate the com-
puted effective rate of protection, where the effective rate exceeds the nomi-
nal rate. For the net rate of protection the overstatement of the effective rate
28. This is readily seen from equation (C.5), where V) is understated by the net amount
of the understatement ofand overstatement ofI
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of protection more than offsets the understatement of value-added at world
prices. As a result, the net rate of protection is also overstated.
Finally, we have not taken into account the possibility that the structure
of protection might have caused substitution in the input—output relation-
ships.2 9Forthe industries considered we do not have enough observations or
reasonably homogeneous inputs and outputs to estimate the substitution elas-
ticities between inputs, and hence are not in a position to make the appro-
priate empirical adjustments of our estimates. If there is in fact a positive 1
elasticity of substitution, the zero elasticity of substitution (i.e., fixed coeffi- 1
cient) assumption means that our estimates overstate the actual rates of pro-
tection.3°
Putting these three biases together, we can unambiguously say that our 2
computed effective rates of protection overstate the true picture where the 2
effective rate exceeds the nominal rate. Our computed net rates of protec- 2
tion, however, are subject to offsetting influences which prevent an unam-
biguous statement concerning the bias, although our general presumption is 2
that they are also overstated. 2
2
(c) Estimated rates of protection
We prepared estimates of protection for a broad range of industrial activi-
ties (Table 111-5). For each activity there is an estimated rate of effective, net,
and nominal protection. Each rate of protection is estimated initially on the
basis of the quota restrictions (QR's). Then we estimated the element of
protection due to the combined influence of tariffs, indirect taxes, and other
non-quota elements (the tariff-tax system). The difference between the two
indicates how much additional protection the licending system provided over
and above the protection due to the tariff-tax system. These estimates all 2
refer to 1968.
The estimates contained in Table 111-5 are industry averages where data
from more than one establishment were available. The average is a weighted
3
average, using the share of value-added at world prices for the effective rates
of protection and the share of output at world prices for the net and nominal 3
rates of protection. This, of course, is not the same as calculating rates of






29. See J. Clark Leith, "Substitution and Supply Elasticities in Calculating the Effective 31
ProtectiveRate," Quarterly Journal of Economics, Vol. LXXXII, No. 4, November





Protection of Ghanaian industries, 1968 and 1970 (rates and standard deviations of rates
in percentages, ranks in ascending order)







Effective rates of protection
Quota restrictions (QR's)
Rate S.D. (Rank)
1221Gold mining (9) 3 —12 6(2)
1222Bauxite mining (9) 1 —3 (6)
1223Manganese mining (9) 1 —3 (7)
2010Meat processing (6) 3 35 92(21)
2031Fruit squash (9) 1 —13 (1)
2039Fruit and veg. processing (5, 7) 1 498 (37)
2055Coffee hulling• (7) 1 106 (27)
2061Biscuits (2, 7) 2 247 ** (33)
2082Cocoa butter (9) 1 (44)
2089Confectionery (7) 2 385 29668(35)
2111Distillery (1,7) 2 (46)
2131Brewery (3,4, 7) 2 56 32(25)
2140Soft drinks (2, 7) 4 20 17(17)
2201Processing raw tobacco (7) 2 1803 (42)
2311Kente (9) 2 —3 6(5)
2320Knitting (3, 6) 1 927 (40)
2411Wearing apparel (6) 13 749 521(39)
2430Shoes (6) 20 1633 1507(41)
2443Mattresses (1, 7) 1 2 (8)
2444Towels,bedsheets,etc. (1,8) 2 23 70(18)
2449Blankets (1, 3, 7) 1 53 (24)
2511Sawn timber and lumber (9) 34 —10 6(3)
2601Furniture (1,7) 17 24 136(19)
2609Fixtures (1, 7) 1 548 (38)
2720Misc.paper (1,6) 4 11 35(11)
2912Handbags and luggage (3,7) 7 (45)
3003Rubber processing (7) 2 16 0(13)
3119lnd.chem. (1,8) 1 4 (9)
3121Copraoil (3,7) 1 19 (16)
3122Groundnut oil (7) 1 108 (28)
3123Palmoil (3,7) 1 14 (12)
3130Paints (6) 1 (47)
3193Perfumes (1,6) 3 174 143(32)
3194Pharmaceut. (1,4,7) 4 45 6(23)
3195Insecticides (4,6) 1 165 (31)
3196Cosmetics (1, 3, 6) 3 78374 78204(43)
3197Candles (3, 7) 1 —7 (4)
3199Misc, chemicals (1, 6) 1 19 (14)
3412Nails (8) 1 19 (15)
3501Al.ware (2,8) 3 30 67(20)
3701St. batteries (6) 1 158 (30)
3703Radio, etc. (2, 8) 2 449 (36)
3709Refrig. (1,6) 1 41 (22)
3920Optical (1,7) 1 123 (29)
3949Jewelry (1,7) 2 7 4(10)
3959Records (7) 1 347 (34)
3990Misc, plastics (1, 8) 8 70 247(26)Table111-5 (continued)




Tar. +surchg. Tar. +surchg.
-QR
Rate S.D. (Rank) Rate S.D.
—12 6(4) 0 —13 7(2) —1
—3 (8) 0 —3 (8) —o
—3 (9) 0 —3 (7) —o
10 122(13) 25 63 73(25) 28
—13 (2) 0 —15 (1) —3
498 (40) - 0 478 (37) —20
58 (28) 48 57 (23) —49
247
** (36) 0 246 **(33) —1
_107* (46) 0 —105k (44) +2
38529668(38) 0 37929197(36) —5
_312* **(47) 0 _277* **(46) 36
43 21(25) 13 42 21(20) —14
20 17(20) 0 19 17(18) —1
1803 (43) 0 1800 (39) —3
6(7) 0 —4 5(6) —1
927 (42) 0 1992 (40) 1065
389 252(39) 361 926 589(38) 176
36 96(23) 1597 2045 1674(41) 411
—4 (6) 5 —8 (4) —10
23 70(21) 0 188 592(28) 165
53 (27) 0 52 (22) —1
—12 7(3) 2 —10 6(3) 0
24 136(22) 0 9 140(12) —15
548 (39) 0 —246 (45) —794
11 36(14) 1 14 37(14) 3
_56* **(45) —136 _30* **(43) 162
16 0(16) 0 15 0(15) —1
4 (10) 0 —3 (9) —7
19 (19) 0 9 (11) —11
58 (29) 50 57 (24) —51
14 (15) 0 12 (13) —2
117 (1) —770 _391* (47) 262
174 143(34) 0 340 272(34) 226
45 6(26) 0 42 8(21) —2
165 (33) 0 195 (30) 30
7837478204(44) 0 116993116741(42) 38619
—7 (5) 0 —8 (5) —1
19 (17) 0 35 (17) 16
19 (18) 0 38 (18) 19
9 101(12) 21 40 149(19) 10
158 (32) 0 199 (32) 41
321 (37) 128 371 (35) —79
41 (24) 0 189 (29) +148
123 (31) 0 123 (27) 0
5 6(11) 2 4 6(10) —3
198 (35) 149 196 (31) —151
















































1221Gold mining —6 3(3) —6 3(4) 0
1222Bauxite mining —3 (4) —3 (6) 0
1223Manganese mining 2 (6) —2 (8) 0
2010Meat processing 5 16(12) 2 20(13) 3
2031Fruit squash —7 (1) —7 (3) 0
2039Fruit and veg. processing82 (41) 62 (42) 0
2055Coffee hulling 17 (26) 9 (23) 8
2061Biscuits 92 (44) 92 (45) 0
2082Cocoa butter 8 (18) 8 (20) 0
2089Confectionery 81 13(42) 81 13(43) 0
2111Distillery 28 (33) 28 (36) 0
2131Brewery 46 31(36) 35 21(38) 11
2140Soft drinks 6 13(13) 6 13(14) 0
2201Processing raw tobacco 55 (40) 55 (41) 0
2311Kente 0 5 (7) 0 5(10) 0
2320Knitting 112 (46) 112 (47) 0
2411Wearing apparel 52 31(39) 42 22(39) 10
2430Shoes 25 25(31) 8 29(18) 17
2443Mattresses 1 (10) —2 (9) 3
2444Towels, bedsheets, etc. 1 10(8) 1 10(11) 0
2449Blankets 25 (32) 25 (34) 0
2511Sawn timber and lumber —6 2(2) —8 3(2) 2
2601Furniture 6 10(15) 6 10(16) 0
2609Fixtures 10 (21) 10 (24) 0
2720Misc, paper 12 17(23) 12 17(26) 0
2912Handbags and luggage 90 35(43) 51 35(40) 39
3003Rubber processing 150.04(25) 150.04(28) 0
3119Ind.cjiem. 1 (9) 1 (12) 0
3121Copra oil 7 (16) 7 (17) 0
3122Groundnut oil 46 (37) 25 (33) 21
3123Palm oil 14 (24) 14 (27) 0
3130Paints 47 (38) —8 (1) 56
3193Perfumes 29 29(34) 29 29(37) 0
3194Pharmaceut. 19 6(27) 19 6(29) 0
3195Insecticides 8 (17) 8 (19) 0
3196Cosmetics 103 18(45) 103 18(46) 0
3197Candles —2 (5) —2 (7) 0
3199Misc. chemicals 6 (14) 6 (15) 0
3412Nails 11 (22) 11 (25) 0
3501Al. ware 4 14(11) —4 18(5) 8
3701St. batteries 21 (28) 21 (30) 0
3703Radio, etc. 32 (35) 28 (35) 5
3709Refrig. 9 (19) 9 (21) 0
3920Optical 25 (30) 25 (32) 0
3949Jewelry 9 5(20) 9 7(22) 0
3959Records 155 (47) 88 (44) 67
3990Misc. plastics 23 31(29) 23 58(31) 0— Table111-5 (continued)
(12) (13)(14) (15) (16)
Nominal rate of protection***
Tar. +surchg. T+S— QR's Tariffs QR—
QR Tar.
RateS.D.(Rank) RateS.D.(Rank)RateS.D.(Rank)
—6 4(3) —O 0 0 (1) 0 0(1) 0
1..
—3 (8) —0 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 2
—3 (9) —0 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 2
11 12(21) 7 2213(20) 1915(21) 3 2
—8 (1) —1 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 2
60 (39) —2 88 (40) 88 (41) 0 2
9 (18) —8 24 (22) 17 (20) 8 2
92 (44) —0 103 (42) 103 (44) 0 2.
8 (17) —0 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 2
79 13(41) —1 10520(43) 10520(45) 0 2


































































































25 (29) —0 35 (30) 35 (32) 0
—6 2(2) 0 0 0 (1) 0 0(1) 0 2
—3 14(6) —9 15 9 (15) 15 9(16) 0 2



































































































































































































87 (43) 67 164 (47) 97 (43) 67
28 60(32) 5 3331(29) 33 53(30) 0
ITable 111-5 (continued)
(17) (18)
Nominal rate of protection***
T+S




















2444 Towels, bedsheets, etc.
2449 Blankets
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Notes and Sow-ces to Table 111-5
Notes: *Negativevalue-added at world priceS.
1- ** Negativevalue-added in one or more establishments of industry.
Nominal rate of protection is the net effect of deflators on the left-hand
side of (CA), (C-il) and (C-14) assuming I =1percent, rb =5percent, r =3
percent.
1. No data on quota premia for all establishments.
2. No data on quota premia for one or more establishments.
3. Domestic production exceeds 90 percent of total domestic use, valued at
domestic prices.
4. 90 percent or more domestic production under price control.
5. Less than 10 percent domestic production under psice control.
6. More than 90 percent domestic output competing with items covered by
surcharges.
7. Less than 5 percent domestic output competing with items covered by
surcharges.
8. Between 5 percent and 90 percent domestic output competing with items
covered by surcharges.
9. Export industries, with zero nominal protection, or negative if subject to an
export tax.
Source:See text and Appendix C.
Consider the initial situation of protection due to the QR's. There are
several negative or near-zero rates of protection which reflect the effects of
the protective structure in levying a taxing effect on inputs that exceed the
subsidy effect on outputs. The most obvious cases are the export industries
that cannot obtain any protection of output via the protective structure but
are subject to the taxing effect of higher-cost inputs: gold, bauxite, manga-
nese, mining, fruit squash, kente weaving, and sawmilling. In addition, there is
one "import-substitution" industry, candles, that has negative protection,
which means there is a negative import-substitution effect.
In the positive range of protection, there are a few cases of negligible
protection to four cases of negative value-added at world prices. At the low
end of the scale (less than 10 percent Effective Rate of Protection —ERP)are
industries producing mattresses, industrial chemicals, and jewelry. Moderate
levels are enjoyed by industries such as beer, blankets, and pharmaceuticals.
High to very high effective protection is received by a long list ranging from
groundnut oil and coffee hulling (just over 100 percent), through records
(over 300 percent), radio and TV assembly (over 400 percent) to apparel
(over 700 percent), and shoes and cosmetics (over 1000 percent).
There are four cases of negative value-added at world prices (indicated in
the table by *).Thissimply means that the value of output deflated to world
prices is less than the value of inputs, again at world prices. These are indus-
tries producing cocoa butter, distillery products, handbags and luggage, andr
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paints. In the case of cocoa butter, which is an export industry, the cocoa
beans are purchased at a subsidized price s'is-â-vis the world market in order
to receive protection.
Comparing the protection due to the QR's with that attributable to tariffs
alone, there were 20 for which we do not have QR premia. Of the remainder,
13 had nominal protection due to QR's in excess of that due to tariffs and
indirect taxes. In those cases where the QR premium we calculated was less
than the nominal protection due to tariffs and indirect taxes, we assumed
that at a minimum the establishment received the nominal protection due to
the latter. This procedure implicitly assumes that the tariff is not redundant.
In the seven cases where redundancy may be relevant (those where domestic
production exceeds 90 percent of domestic use), there are two cases (brewery
and travel goods) in which the nominal QR protection exceeds the nominal
tariff protection.Inthefive other cases (knitting, blankets, copraoil,
palm oil, and cosmetics) we do not have QR for two, while for the remaining
three (knitting, copra oil, and palm oil) the nominal protection is probably
overstated.
Our industry and protection data can also provide useful information on
the protective effects of the surcharges introduced in August 1970. An impor-
tant feature of the surcharges was that an item subject to surcharge was also
placed under OGL. As a consequence the nominal protection granted an
industry competing with surcharge-laden imports is equal to (or less than) the
tariff and surcharge nominal protection: the QR was no longer binding.
Hence the comparison between the QR protection and the tariffs-plus-
surcharges protection indicates the changes in protection due to this liberaliz-
ing measure
Given the way the surcharges operated, it was possible for the surcharges
either to increase or decrease the protection of output. And, of course, sur-
charges on importable inputs decreased protection. Assuming that the sur-
charges were fully applied,32 we computed surcharge rates protecting out-
puts, and chargeable on importable inputs. We then recalculated surcharge
inclusive of rates of protection. For completeness we also allowed for the
elimination of the 1 percent import license fee, which was abandoned at the
end of 1968.
The results of the surcharges ranged from substantial increases in protec-
tion to the imposition of negative protection on a previously positively pro.
31. We are assuming away major structural change within the industries between 1968
and 1970.
32. Because of the limited experience with the surcharge this was the only option open
to us. In theory this is appropriate, as the surcharges are applicable to virtually all
importers, including manufacturers exempt from regular duties. In practice, excep-
tions or evasions may be extensive.76 Allocation of Resources
tected industry. Of the twelve industries which had 90 percent or more of
their output competing with imports subject to surcharge, only one had its
protection reduced due to surcharges. Most of the industries which did not
compete with surcharged imports were negatively affected via increased input
costs, although some had small increases in their protection. Of the 35 indus-
tries not competing with surcharged imports, 27 had their protection reduced
due to surcharges. This very mixed and discriminatory resultis in sharp
contrast with the equal treatment that would have been accorded all indus-
tries via an equal proportionate across-the-board tariff and export subsidy (or,
of course, a devaluation).33
At the industry level it is clear that the 1968 protective structure in the
Ghanaian industrial sector instituted vastly different stimuli between indus-
tries. And the changes instituted by the 1970 surcharges resulted in additional
discriminatory changes in the protective structure, retaining the major differ-
ences between the protection enjoyed by the various industries.
The picture of substantial and apparently random variation is also found at
the establishment level. The variation is evident when we consider the stand-
ard deviations of protective rates for individual establishments in the cases of
multi-establishment industries. The industries with a large number of estab-
lishments such as apparel, shoes, sawmiiling, furniture, and plastics all have
standard deviations at least two-thirds the size of the average rate of effective
protection. This is true for the basic protection due to tariffs as well as that
due to QR's. Note also that the standard deviations of these industries did not
decline with the introduction of the 1970 surcharges. The, randomness is
suggested by the lack of any significant relationship between the effective
rate of protection and several potential explanatory variables. To test the
possibility that differences in the rates of effective protection might be asso-
ciated with certain establishment characteristics, we regressed the effective
rate of protection under the quota restriction (QRERP) on: the number of
years since production started (YSPS); a dummy for type of ownership
(TOWND) set equal to unity for state and joint ownership and equal to zero
for other types; a dummy for nationality of ownership (NOWND) set equal to
unity for non-Ghanaian and mixed enterprises and equalto zero for
Ghanaian; and finally a regional dummy (REGD) set equal to unity for the
Accra-Tema capital district and equal to zero for all other regions. Our sample
consists of 101 establishments with positive value-added at world prices, and
for which the data were complete. The regression yielded the following
result:
33. See J. Clark Leith, "Across-the-Board Nominal Tariff Changes and the Effective Rate
of Protection," Economic Journal, Vol. LXXVIII, No. 312, December 1968.
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QRERP =2.4YSPS —244.0TOWND + 414.8 NOWND + 784.7 REGD
(0.05)(—0.21) (0.49) (0.94)
R2= 0.0178
None of the coefficients is significantly different from zero (t values in paren-
theses) and the explanatory power of the equation is very low.34 These
establishment characteristics thus do not offer an explanation of the variation
in effective rates of protection.
The protection of Ghanaian industrial establishments appears to be largely
random. When set against the declared policy of simply promoting industriali-
zation per Se, the rationale for this apparently random dissemination of pro-
tection is not at all obvious. Yet when we recognize that this protective
structure developed over several years, with protective instruments frequently
brought into play to achieve other objectives, and with a complexity that
both researchers and policy-makers would find difficult to sort out, we con-
clude that the variability and randomness of the protection of Ghanaian
industrial activities was largely unintended.
4. Domestic resource costs in manufacturing
The effective rates of protection we reported in section 3 demonstrate that
the trade regime instituted resource pulls that differ substantially between
activities of the industrial sector. The purpose of this section is to cite a
similar piece of evidence, using a slightly different measure, which also shows
wide variation in the stimuli afforded Ghanaian manufacturing activities.
William F. Steel's study of Ghana's import-substitution policies35 contains
• a set of domestic resource cost (DRC) estimates for a sample of 41 Ghanaian
manufacturing establishments. His data were collected directly from the
firms, and cover the period mid-1967 through mid-1968. The scope of cover-
age is somewhat more limited than our ERP estimates, but by relying on
• direct collection he was able to check data more thoroughly and obtain more
detailed information than we were able to.
The concept of domestic resource, costs is closely related to both the
effective exchange rate and the effective rate of protection. At the same time
it is designed to take into account social opportunity costs which neither of
34. An identical regression, omitting the 2511 group (sawmilling) yielded similar coeffi-
cients and t values.
35. See W.F. Steel, "Import Substitution and Excess Capacity in Ghana." Oxford
Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 24, No. 2, July 1972, based on his unpublished
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the other measures does directly. The DRC refers to the number of units of
local currency required to earn (or save) a unit of foreign exchange. Hence it
is denominated in new cedis per dollar just as the effective exchange rate. The
similarity with the ERP is that it focuses on value-added in domestic produc-
tion and takes into account the effect of the price distortions on both output
and inputs. At the simplest level of similarity the ERP may be translated into
the DRC in the same way as the nominal tariff is translated into the effective
exchange rate (see Chapter II, section 3). Thus:
DRC(l+ERP)r (3.1)
where
DRC =domesticresource cost,per $,ERP=effectiverate of protection,
and rofficialexchange rate, per $.
Typically,DRC estimates take into account not only the trade regime which
the ERP focuses on, but also allow for the appropriate "shadow prices" or
social opportunity costs of the priniary factors, capital and labor.36 When
these are included, the relationship of equation does not strictly hold.
Differences of definition aside, the DRC estimate for a local activity is an
indicator of the extent to which the distortions taken into account provide a
stimulus to that activity relative to, say, the official exchange rate or some
(usually higher) social opportunity cost of foreign exchange.
Steel's estimates of DRC's in the 41 firms he covered point to the same
general conclusion about randomness of outcomes as our ERP estimates:
there is wide variation in the economic returns to Ghanaian import-substitu-
tion industries: The DRC estimates (Table 111-6) range from 0.29 per
dollar to 30.55 per dollar and beyond into the range of negative value-
added at world prices. Further, substantial differences between firms persist
within industry groups. For example, in the textile industry the range is
0.44 per dollar to negative value-added at world prices. (The official exchange
rate at the time was 1 .02 per dollar.) In sum, using a different set of data
and a different measure, Steel's DRC work and our ERP estimates suggest the
same sort of conclusion: the resource pulls instituted by the restrictive system
exhibited substantial and apparently random variation.
Steel also considered the extent to which DRC's were related to various
characteristics of the firms. He found that the DRC was related: positively
36. Because capital costs are not consistently available from the CBS survey, we did not
attempt to use the data collected for the ERP estimates to compute DRC rates.
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Table 111-6
Steel's domestic resource cost estimates, 196 7—1968 (DRC in new cedis per dollar, tanks
in ascending order)
Industry group DRC Rank
11.Rice milling 1.15 7(tie)

























































































38.Transport equipment 4.40 25
39.Plastics, miscellaneous 23.96 30
'1
Note: *= negativevalue-added at world prices.
Source:W.F. Steel, "Import Substitution and Excess Capacity
Table A-i.
in Ghana," op. cit.,
•180 Allocation of Resources
with size of firm, the capital/labor ratio, and assembly type operations; and
negatively with capacity utilization.3He concluded that
Inefficiency was found to be related to incentives established by foreign exchange
policies. High effective protection resulting from restrictive tariffs on "nonessential"
final goods encouraged final-stage assembly, which was significantly less efficient in
utilizing resources than more integrated production. Large-size and relatively capital-
intensive techniques similarly were associated with relatively inefficient production
and were stimulated by licencing procedures, special concessions for capital, and
minimum wages for labour. 38
This did not augur well for the success of import-substituting industrialization
as a dynamic source of growth.
37. See W.F. Steel, op. cit., Table VIII. Nationality of ownership and state ownership
were not significant.
38.Ibid.,p.235.